Russia’s invasion has devastated Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, turning a once-diverse and export-capable power sector into one struggling with deficits. As reconstruction begins, the priority is not simply to restore capacity, but to build a modern, resilient, and sustainable energy system. This article outlines key strategies to guide that transformation.
Before Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine had a well-balanced and diversified energy portfolio. Power generation was dominated by nuclear energy, with around 50% of Ukraine’s electricity coming from stable baseload sources (primarily nuclear), around 42% from balancing sources (fossil fuels, hydro, and biogas), and only 8% from intermittent renewables like solar and wind.
This landscape dramatically changed due to Russia’s targeted attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Fossil fuel plants and significant hydropower stations—including the Kakhovka and Dnipro hydroelectric plants—suffered devastating damage. Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, once the largest in Europe, has been under Russian occupation since the early days of the Russian invasion and is now dysfunctional. While other nuclear power plants were only partially affected, mainly at the level of output capacity, renewable energy sources (RES) have also suffered a lot, primarily due to their expropriation by Russians on the temporarily occupied territories or their destruction/damage due to the ongoing warfare.
As a result, according to the available data, Ukraine lost approximately 23 GW of power generation capacity. Once a net exporter of electricity, Ukraine now faces a daily deficit, generating only about 15 GW against a minimum demand of 19 GW. The estimated total damage to the country’s power generation and transmission sector exceeds $20 billion.
Further compounding the crisis, natural gas and oil facilities have also been repeatedly targeted. Ukraine has lost roughly 40% of its natural gas production capacity and about the entirety of its domestic oil refining capability. Offshore wells between Crimea and Odesa are now mostly idle, with Russia allegedly having exploited them for its own benefit.
Our most acute problem is that Russians destroyed our balancing generation. The latter is needed to quickly increase or decrease the supply of electricity into the grid according to natural/economic factors.
We now have 15 nuclear reactors in operation. Taken together, and assuming that all of them continue to work at any given moment, they are capable of generating 13.835 GW of electricity daily. That is a baseload power generation/supply you can do nothing about without shutting any reactor down. The RES are only intermittent power supply sources. It is good to have them, yet they do not alter the whole picture. Only hydro power (about 50% of the pre-war capacity) can balance the power supply needs. Regretfully, we have to import the rest now. In other words, we try to use the imported electricity as the balancing power. Yet it also has its challenges as the foreign suppliers export electricity on a permanent contractual basis as opposed to the “on-demand” one.
Given the extent of the damage done, the needs for the reconstruction of the energy sector, and ensuring its decreased vulnerability, the priority investment areas in the sector can be identified as follows:
Ukraine’s energy crisis is also a transformative opportunity. The country’s wind, solar, hydro, and biomass potential is vast, with plans to trsiple RES capacity from the pre-war 9.9 GW to over 30 GW by 2032.
Renewables offer not only energy independence but also rural economic development, job creation, and environmental benefits. The low cost of labour and raw materials makes Ukraine particularly attractive for biomass development. With supportive policy and investment, bioenergy could emerge as an important component in Ukraine’s clean energy transition.
Apart from the occupied Zaporizzhia NPP, the current Ukrainian NPP fleet remains largely intact. However, most reactors are Soviet-era and nearing the end of their operational lifespan. All of them are of Russian origin, which makes them doomed for all planning purposes. With the failure to complete Khmelnytsky NPP construction with the two Bulgaria-owned Russian VVER-1000 blocks, Ukraine must pivot to Western nuclear technologies.
Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) represent a promising frontier. With a capacity of up to 500 MW, each one can constantly meet the needs of a mid-sized Ukrainian city or town. Their compact size (up to 500 MW) makes them ideal for decentralization, with reduced vulnerability to attacks. A memorandum with Holtec proposes deploying 20 SMRs, but more will be needed to stabilize the grid and replace lost capacity.
Rebuilding Ukraine’s energy sector must also address accountability for war-inflicted damages. Legal mechanisms remain limited, but options include:
The international legal and political community must adapt to ensure that those responsible for the destruction bear financial responsibility for rebuilding.
Ukraine stands at a pivotal moment. The widespread destruction of its energy infrastructure, while tragic, opens the door to a modern, resilient, and sustainable energy future. With strong international partnerships and a bold commitment to renewables and decentralized systems, Ukraine can emerge as a regional leader in clean energy and energy security. Rebuilding its power sector is not just about restoring what was lost; it’s about reimagining what’s possible.
